Day: October 9, 2023

On October 8, Ilham Aliyev, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, arrived in Georgia for a working visit at the invitation of Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Garibashvili, the Press Office of the Azerbaijani President reported. Levan Davitashvili, the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia, and other officials welcomed the President of Azerbaijan.

On the same day, Ilham Aliyev held a one-on-one meeting with Irakli Garibashvili. After the meeting, Aliyev and Garibashvili made press statements in Tbilisi.

Garibashvili said, “Azerbaijan is a Strategic Partner of Georgia – an outstanding, friendly state – with which we have a centuries-old kind, neighborly brotherhood and friendship. This bond continues between our people, and Mr. Ilham Aliyev has great merits.” He noted: “Azerbaijan is one of the largest trade partners of Georgia and is consistently ranked in the Top 5 Countries every single year. Trade volume grew by 15% this year.”

About the Middle Corridor and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Project, the Prime Minister of Georgia emphasized, “We reviewed the prospects of advancing the Middle Corridor, too. You may well be aware that we are coordinating our work with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to make sure that it gets developed most efficiently, implying railway modernization, extension, and construction of ports, as well as the development and modernization of land roads. I know that Azerbaijan has launched wide-scale works towards this end. We in Georgia have also started to work on the railway modernization, which will be completed at the end of 2024. Its throughput will increase and double upon completion. We are also launching the construction of a new port in Anaklia very soon. Its throughput will be 100 million tons when the last phase gets completed. Also, the East-West Highway (EWH) construction will be finished very soon. We are, of course, cooperating with Azerbaijan on all these projects. Also, another historic project will be completed in a few months. I am referring to a project of strategic significance – Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Project – which is progressing very successfully now, and we will be completing it in several months.”

Garibashvili also offered mediation to Azerbaijan and Armenia: “We have always been impartial here in Georgia and are ready to contribute to this issue today. We want to be a mediator in this matter and are ready to offer any friendly format. Our future should be peaceful and stable, and all three countries of the South Caucasus should address regional issues themselves.”

About the issue of normalization of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, President Aliyev noted, “As you know, several countries and also some international organizations are trying to support the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan today. We welcome that. If it is not lop-sided and biased, of course, we welcome any mediation and assistance. However, in my opinion, considering both the historical relations and the geographical factor, the most correct option in this field would certainly be Georgia. I am grateful to the Prime Minister, who has also offered possible mediation in this area. I think that we should expect the same approach from Armenia as a country that is ready for this, and if Armenia agrees, the heads of our relevant authorities can immediately come to Georgia for both bilateral and trilateral meetings.”

On the economic ties, the Azerbaijani leader noted, “Today we exchanged views on the construction of Anaklia port. As you know, Azerbaijan has [one of SOCAR’s first and most important investments] Kulevi port on the Black Sea coast of Georgia, and the expansion of that port will certainly strengthen our cooperation. Of course, increasing the carrying capacity of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway by more than five times and its launch shortly will certainly strengthen the Middle Corridor. Apart from the traditional fields in the energy sector, there is a ‘Green Energy Corridor’ project that unites us today. Here, too, we – Georgia and Azerbaijan, the two brotherly countries – are closely cooperating with Europe, and a feasibility study for this project will be ready in the coming months. I am sure that after that, we will start concrete work. Major investment is planned, and thus the ‘Green Energy Corridor,’ an energy cable, will be built, strengthening the energy security of both Azerbaijan and our partner countries.”

Flames and smoke billow during Israeli strikes in Gaza, October 9, 2023. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem Acquire Licensing Rights

Last March, a Palestinian delegation arrived in Moscow for talks with Russian officials. The delegation was from Hamas, the militant Palestinian group that’s been labeled a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. The meeting, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, touched on Russia’s “unchanged position in support of a just solution to the Palestinian problem.”

“When considering the issue of restoring Palestinian national unity, the Russian side expressed its readiness to continue to assist in overcoming differences and bringing together the positions of leading Palestinian political forces and movements on the platform of the Palestine Liberation Organization,” the ministry’s readout said.

Russia’s ties to Hamas are well-documented, as are its ties to Hamas’s main backer, Iran. For some observers and commentators of the ongoing bloodshed in Israel, that in itself is cause for blaming Moscow, accusing it of having a direct hand in the spiraling violence.

That’s not correct, said Hanna Notte, a Berlin-based analyst with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and an expert on Russian policy in the Middle East.

Russia’s embrace of Iran has benefited Moscow in its war on Ukraine, with Tehran supplying kamikaze drones and other equipment to help Russian forces seeking to hold back a slow-moving Ukrainian counteroffensive. But it’s a big stretch to extrapolate from there and say Russia would endorse Hamas’s bloody assault and risk outright disruption in relations with Israel, whose ties to Moscow are lukewarm but certainly not hostile, she said.

In an October 9 phone interview with RFE/RL, Notte explained more of the nuances involving Russia’s role in the Middle East. The interview has been slightly edited for clarity and grammar.

RFE/RL: You are skeptical of speculation that there could somehow be a Russian role in this attack? Is there any indication that they might have some sort of direct, or indirect connection to this?

Hanna Notte: So looking at this, there’ve been selective reports over the last years, and this predates the war in Ukraine, that Russian-made systems have shown up in Hamas’s hands. Anti-tank missiles, shoulder-launched, anti-aircraft missiles; this goes back years and Israel, at the time, assumed that these weapons fell into Hamas hands via Iran. So I’ve never seen an indication of direct, large weapons shipments from Russia to Hamas, let alone Hamas being trained by Russian military. And again, in the context of this latest attack, I have yet to see the evidence that this is Russian weapons or that the Russians have trained Hamas. So I don’t see a direct role here.

Of course, Russia-Hamas relations go way back. I mean, they were invited to Moscow, I guess, in 2006, after they won the election in the Palestinian territories, and there’ve been Hamas delegations that have been going ever since. You know, the Russians have been quite active in recent years, trying to mediate between different Palestinian factions. And of course, they’ve never recognized Hamas as a terrorist organization. They’ve always argued that, you know, the different factions need to forge unity.

And it’s sort of a niche that the Russians have carved out for themselves on the peace process, because they’ve lamented quite frequently in the last few years that the Americans monopolize the peace process, especially during the Trump administration and the ‘Deal of the Century’ [a controversial Trump-era peace proposal]. So they tried to carve out this niche, priding themselves on talking to all the Palestinian factions. Factions came to Moscow frequently.…

So Russians have been active on the Palestinian side, and that goes back historically. The Soviet Union took quite a pro-Palestinian stance. The Russian [Foreign Ministry] has historically taken quite a pro-Palestinian stance or a very, as it says, a very even-handed approach on the conflict. So these relations go way back. That is true. But I don’t think that we can infer from that, that there is sort of direct military support.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (right) holds talks with then Hamas leader Khaled Mashal in Moscow in March 2006.

There’s another question about whether Russia’s role matters indirectly here. I would argue that because of the war in Ukraine, because of the severe deterioration in Russia-West relations, and therefore, the changing geopolitics of the Russia-Iran relationship, Russia is, broadly speaking, enabling Iran more in the region. So Iran feels more emboldened. Iran gives drones and other support to Russia. It is probably getting some sort of support from Russia in return.

The Russians have become less enthusiastic about seeing the JCPOA [the 2015 Iran nuclear deal] being restored. They’ve become more forgiving of Iran. And so this general sense of ‘emboldenment’ might be playing into what we’re seeing right now. So there is a Russia, there is a Ukraine war connection here, but I see it as being more indirect as opposed to direct.

RFE/RL: Okay, well, you’ve jumped into three questions that I planned to ask there, so that’s great. So what is the benefit that Russia might somehow gain from all this?

Notte: I’m a bit of two minds here as well. I think on the one hand, it is certainly true that fostering instability, tensions, violence in the Middle East is broadly speaking beneficial to Russia right now. If they can foster crises and instability elsewhere, and deflect attention from Western states, from the United States primarily, away from Ukraine and from NATO’s eastern flank, that is beneficial in the broader geopolitical game right now. If a byproduct of what we’re seeing right now is to throw a wrench into Israeli-Saudi normalization talks, I think that’s also welcome to Moscow because Israeli-Saudi relations, that’s an American game. So that’s sort of on the benefit side for Russia.

Hanna Notte (file photo)

On the potential negative side for them, I look at Russian foreign policy in the Middle East as a policy that is about fostering carefully calibrated instability, low-level instability. I don’t see how if this escalates into a bigger war, an Israel-Iran confrontation that might then well engulf Lebanon and Syria, how this would necessarily be beneficial for Russia. Because the Russians have naval and air bases in Syria, which are very important to them; they project power into the eastern Mediterranean from those bases. Those bases are important as logistics hub for the Russians to continue their operations in Africa and the Sahel and … Wagner [the Russian mercenary group founded by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin] is staying in the game in Africa.

So Syria is important. Now, if Syria gets destabilized by a broader war, the Russians don’t necessarily have the military bandwidth right now to deal with such a situation. So I’m not sure that the bigger war is necessarily in their interest. And it’s not something that they need, I think — sort of more calibrated escalation is more beneficial to them.”

RFE/RL: That’s my next question: Whether Russia has the bandwidth, as it were, to deal with a broader regional war when they have a major investment of military capabilities now tied up in Ukraine: Can they juggle two balls at the same time?

Notte: It’s a good question. It would depend on what kind of Russian involvement would be required. They have kept their bases in Syria. They have kept much of the military hardware in Syria. But that’s been sufficient for keeping the situation under control in Syria, as is, and major combat operations have largely ceased in the country over the last years. The only thing is that you still have what 800-900 American troops in northeast Syria and the Russians have been harassing them more intensively over the last six months, because I think there is, over the medium term, a Russian game to try to push the Americans out of Syria. But a bigger war? That’s a different ballgame.

My own view is that there’s no doubt that Russian-Iranian relations have qualitatively changed. But still, I don’t think that Russia wants to go all-in with Iran, that it wants to disrupt its relations with Israel and with Gulf states. Now, if there’s a larger war, and the Americans come down hard on the side of Israel, as would be very much expected. I think, you know, I mean, they’ve already sent the aircraft carrier to the eastern Mediterranean, there’s no doubt where the Americans would come down in this larger war.

The question then that I have is: Will Russia have to pick sides? Will Russia see no choice but to further drift into the Iranian orbit, if there’s a larger war? They might have to. I’m not sure that they want to. And so that is also why I don’t think the Russians want the situation to go to such a larger war.

RFE/RL: Talk about Moscow’s relationship with Israel these days. It it hot? Is it cold? Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy voiced solidarity with Israel. How would you how would you characterize that relationship these days?

Notte: Maybe lukewarm, but better since [Prime Minister Benyamin] Netanyahu came to power in December. It was more frosty [previously] given the Israeli reaction after the Bucha attack; they criticized Russia quite harshly. But, Israel has [as of] today not delivered lethal weapons to Ukraine. And I think that is appreciated in Moscow, and they want to keep it that way.

So there have been tensions, but there is still a fairly significant trade relationship. There is the big Russian diaspora in Israel, which predates the Ukraine war, but it’s become even bigger since the Ukraine war started.

And there is from the Israeli viewpoint, most importantly, deconfliction over the skies in Syria. That is the primary reason why the Israelis have been so cautious vis-a-vis Russia, and not joined sanctions and not provided lethal support to Ukraine.

And so, yes, it’s been it’s been more rocky than usual, but the personal relationship between Bibi [Netanyahu] and Putin somewhat helps. They get along.

Since Netanyahu came to form the government, it’s been slightly less acrimonious. But I think from Russia’s point of view, keeping the Israelis from going firmly over to Kyiv’s side is important, which is another reason why I sort of personally fail to be convinced that the Russians directly supported Hamas here, because if they did, I would assume that the Israelis will find out sooner rather than later. And then you have lost the Israelis completely if you’re Russia, potentially, and I’m not so sure that you would want to risk that because to keep them from supporting Ukraine has been fairly important to Russia.

The forecasting about Russia’s misinformation campaign aimed at diverting attention to another ‘unsuitable’ target in matters of supplying weapons to Hamas militants for attacking Israel was confirmed. 

On October 7, RLI warned that by using its warm relations with Hezbollah, Russia would send to the Gaza Strip a few units of weaponry captured on Ukraine’s battlefields – as evidence to back their claims. 

The next day, October 8, Russian affiliated military intelligence-Telegram channels were actively spreading a fake story claiming that Israeli soldiers near Ashkelon had found a pickup truck with a Soviet-made RPG-7 anti-tank grenade. The weapon allegedly had markings of a ‘Ukrainian unit from Mukachevo, Zakarpattia region’.

As we know, this weapon belongs to the 128th mountain infantry brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. While studying the materials, we came to the conclusion that this is the part of the weapons (including Soviet RPG-7 and AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers) the mentioned unit lost in December 2022 near the village of Pidgorodne, one mile in the north- east of Bakhmut town. They left the weapon while withdrawing from its positions, which came under the control of the Wagner PMC militants.

In this way Ukrainian Soviet-type weapons were transported by the Wagner Group to Russian territory, then the ammunition was sent by Russian Aerospace Forces to the Khmeimim airbase, Syria, and further to the training bases of Hezbollah and Hamas fighters in the vicinity of Damascus. However, we found evidence of Hamas militants being armed with Russian export AK-103-2 assault rifles.

Islamic Jihad fighter with AO-103-2 assault rifle.

In 2019, we tracked illegal AK-103 rifles sales on the Iraqi market after the Assad regime government supplying the guns.

The AK-103 entered service in Russia in 1993, precluding its placement in Soviet-era warehouses. Thus, these facts confirm the Kremlin’s involvement in the preparation and organization of the Hamas operation against Israel. As far as we know the Wagner and Redut mercenaries trained Palestinians at the training bases in Syria. Since both Russian units are under the operational control of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (formerly the GRU), the transfer of captured weapons to the Middle East is part of Russians’ preparations of the special operations in the region and may indicate that the attack on Israel could have been planned in the spring-summer of 2023.

Moreover, we think that there is a high possibility that Russian PMCs could enter the arms market by supplying both captured and Russian Soviet-style weapons to paramilitary and terrorist groups in the Middle East and Africa.

Prior, we published a report on ties and supplies of Russian weapons to terrorist organizations in the Middle East; in particular, the weapons were used during attack an Israeli school bus. 

It is unlikely that the Israeli Merkava battle tanks were destroyed by Palestinian operators launching civilian drones equipped with a combat element drop system. Such an accuracy proves a high-skilled training and practice of the drone operators.According to our estimates, the UAV operators were trained by Iranian or Russian specialists who have got their skills during the war against Ukraine.

“I am convening tomorrow an emergency meeting of EU Foreign Ministers to address the situation in Israel and in the region.,” he wrote.

Hamas attack on Israel

On October 7, Hamas terrorists infiltrated Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip. They managed to capture several settlements, but by evening, Israeli forces regained most of the territory. They also struck military targets and the Hamas headquarters in response.

Israel declared a “state of war” and the beginning of the counter-terrorism Operation Iron Swords.

Today, the IDF announced that Israel has regained control of all areas, but Hamas militants may still be on the territory.

Additionally, European countries have strengthened the protection of Jewish communities after the Hamas attack on Israel.

Some of the Wagner PMC fighters who left Belarus for Africa were involved in training and transferring combat experience to Hamas militants.

This was reported by the National Resistance Centre, Censor.NET reports.

“The key areas of training for Hamas militants have been assault training and the use of small unmanned aerial vehicles to drop explosive material. Only the Russians, among Hamas’s allies, have experience in using drones with mechanisms for dropping explosives on enemy equipment. It was the Wagner drones that were handed over to Hamas militants during exercises in Africa,” the report said.

Source: Al Jazeera and news agencies

The Kremlin aims to exploit Hamas’ attack on Israel to divert Western support and attention away from Ukraine, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported in its daily assessment on Oct. 7.

Following Hamas’ large-scale attacks on Israeli territory on Oct. 7, Russian voices amplified messages blaming Western countries for neglecting conflicts in the Middle East in favor of supporting Ukraine.

In a statement posted on the social media platform X, Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed that the U.S. and Western allies should have been focused on “Palestinian-Israeli settlement” rather than providing Ukraine with military aid.

As part of these information operations, pro-Russian military bloggers have also largely focused on the Hamas attacks in Israel, actively promoting Kremlin narratives.

According to ISW, Russian narratives surrounding the Hamas attacks are aimed at influencing Western audiences. Their objectives include driving a wedge in military support for Ukraine and attempting to demoralize Ukrainian society by claiming Ukraine will lose support from Western allies.

Earlier this week, Russia launched its single deadliest attack against Ukrainian civilians this year, killing 52 people and earning international condemnation.

Read also: ‘Every family affected’: Devastated village copes with aftermath of Russian strike on funeral

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The stunningly successful surprise attack launched by Hamas from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel at the weekend has opened a dark new chapter in the years-long war between the Islamist militant group and its Israeli enemies.

Amid swirling speculation of foreign involvement, the infiltration attack—being referred to by some observers as “Israel’s 9/11″—may yet precipitate seismic shifts in Israel’s foreign affairs.

Hamas justified “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” as a response to Israel’s recent police actions in the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem and to violence by Israeli settlers illegally occupying parts of the Palestinian West Bank.

The operation is believed to have killed at least 700 Israelis, wounded more than 2,100, and resulted in dozens of captives being taken back into the Gaza Strip. Israel’s response is underway, with airstrikes in Gaza killing at least 413 people, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry.

An Israeli soldier ducks for cover near Sderot on October 9, 2023, during a rocket attack from the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces are responding to Hamas’ surprise weekend attack from the Gaza Strip, which has killed hundreds of Israelis.
JACK GUEZ/AFP via Getty Images

Israelis are now considering how the country was caught so catastrophically off guard as speculation mounts of foreign backing for the raid.

Hamas has long been funded, armed and trained by Iran, as one of the Islamist militant organizations—alongside Islamic Jihad also in Gaza, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and a litany of Shia paramilitary formations in Iraq—leveraged by Tehran in its strategic confrontation with Israel and its Western backers.

The weekend attack appears to have thwarted—or at least delayed—the planned normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia; a key strategic goal for Tehran.

Initial reports—and a statement from Hamas—suggest that Iran had a hand in the landmark assault, which is thought to have been prepared over several weeks. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, though, said on Sunday he has “not yet seen evidence that Iran directed or was behind this particular attack, but there is certainly a long relationship.” Iran’s mission to the United Nations has denied any involvement.

There has also been speculation on social media of Russian involvement in the Hamas operation, though there is no evidence indicating Moscow’s alleged role. Newsweek has contacted the Russian foreign ministry by email to request comment.

The Institute for the Study of War has suggested that Russia might benefit from the shift in international attention away from its atrocities in Ukraine and towards the deteriorating situation in Israel and the Palestinian territories. Israel is expected to launch a fresh and bloody ground assault into Gaza in the coming days, while tensions remain high in the occupied West Bank and along the border with Lebanon, where Hezbollah enjoys de facto control.

Regardless, there is no evidence of direct Russian involvement in the weekend attack. Hamas has controlled the Gaza Strip since 2007 and has a long history of infiltration operations into Israeli territory. The militants appear to have used their traditional mixture of indigenous and Iranian weapons for the assault.

Some pro-Ukrainian accounts on X, formerly known as Twitter, claimed without evidence that the Wagner Group mercenary organization may have trained the Hamas units that launched the attack. Wagner has no known presence in the Palestinian territories, while Hamas’ assault units are highly experienced and trained with the assistance of outside powers like Iran.

Others incorrectly suggested that only Russia could have instructed Hamas in its use of drone bombers to target Israeli armor and observation posts. Hamas was at the forefront of the adoption of commercial and military drones, and has regularly used them to attack Israeli military, civilian and infrastructure targets in Israel and the Gaza Strip.

Oleg Ignatov, the Crisis Group think tank’s senior Russia analyst, told Newsweek: “I haven’t seen any evidence; I haven’t seen it in public, I haven’t heard anything about this from my conversations. It’s difficult to imagine that Russia participated in the planning of this attack.

“Of course, we live in a world where we can’t exclude anything. But I haven’t seen any evidence.”

Russia has long maintained a close working relationship with Iran and its network of partner militant organizations—especially Hezbollah in Lebanon—across the Middle East, seeing them as an alternative power base capable of challenging regional American and allied interests. Moscow has drawn closer to Iran since the Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

A missile explodes in Gaza City during an Israeli air strike on October 8, 2023. Israeli forces are bombarding the Gaza Strip in response to Hamas’ weekend infiltration attack.
MAHMUD HAMS/AFP via Getty Images

The Kremlin has retained high-level contacts with Hamas. In March, the militant group sent a high-level delegation to Moscow to hold talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who subsequently warned that Hamas’ “patience” with Israel was “running out.” Hamas leaders also visited Russia in May and September 2022.

Such diplomatic channels should not be confused with direct support, Ignatov said. “Russia has very good connections with Hamas, and everybody knows about this,” he said. “But I think that was part of the policy in the Middle East that it was advantageous for Russia to have the ability to communicate with everyone.”

In seeking to bolster its international prestige and influence, Ignatov said Moscow is more interested in involvement in peace talks rather than trying to sway the fighting. “Russia would be interested in participating in any possible negotiations,” he said. “This means, of course, it would would not be interested in supporting one of the sides.”

Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov was among those who called for calm over the weekend. “It goes without saying that we always call for restraint,” the diplomat said, as quoted by the Interfax news agency. Former President Dmitry Medvedev—known for his anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western diatribes—took the opportunity to blame the U.S. for the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

But some Russian propagandists reveled in Israel’s defeat. Vladimir Solovyov said the Hamas attack was a “loud slap” for Israel and its intelligence services, blaming the U.S. for failing in its role as the “guarantor of peace in the region” and claiming without evidence that Ukraine provided weapons to Hamas.

Others used the attack to hit out at Russians who fled to Israel to escape Moscow’s disastrous war on Ukraine. Margarita Simonyan, the head of RT, wrote on social media: “The country that is not at war with its neighbors is again at war with its neighbors. We await the exodus of Russian pacifists. Then again, we won’t hold our breath.”

Sergey Mardan wrote in a post on his Telegram channel: “This mess is beneficial for Russia, because the globalist toad will be distracted from Ukraine and will get busy trying to put out the eternal Middle Eastern fire.”

“Iran is our real military ally,” Marden added. “Israel is an ally of the United States. Therefore, choosing a side is easy!”

But goading from state media talking heads is not the same as foreign policy, Ignatov said. “That’s not the policy, it’s wishful thinking,” he explained.

“They think that the world works like this. If there is a war in Israel, it means that the United States will send shells and ammunition to Israel rather than to Ukraine. And that means that Russia will have an advantage.”

Update 10/9/23 at 7:35 a.m. ET: This article has been updated to include comment from Oleg Ignatov.