Day: October 6, 2023

Julian Borger

Pjotr Sauer

This analytical article by Dan Perry is republished from Newsweek. Dan Perry is managing partner of the New York-based communications firm Thunder11. He is the former Cairo-based Middle East editor and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press.

It is a grand vexation of geopolitics: the failure of powers to act while action is possible. It can lead to tragedy, decimate power hard and soft, and leave a mess behind,.

So it has been in Nagorno-Karabakh, the restive province of Azerbaijan. No matter where one stands on the complex and emotive dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region, it is safe to say the West comes away looking ridiculous from the sudden exodus of its 120,000 indigenous people.

This shocking event, which many see as one of the largest cases of ethnic cleansing in recent history, creates the world’s newest refugee crisis. It coincided with the sudden collapse of the self-governing authority in the region after a Sept. 19 military attack by Azerbaijan – even as the European Union and the United States inadvertently provided a smokescreen with “peace talks” that diplomats kept claiming were “promising.” And though The New York Times claims no one saw this coming, to me it seems preordained by Western inaction, whether due to impotence, inattention or indifference.

From a broader perspective, it’s understandable that few wanted to take a side on Nagorno-Karabakh, a complicated situation with some moral ambiguity. Armenians see the province as a heartland of an empire that once covered most of the Caucasus, parts of Turkey and beyond. But history intervened, the Soviet Union eventually gobbled up the region, and Nagorno-Karabakh was handed to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan.

For the Soviets, such shenanigans were a feature, not a bug. They purposely scrambled ethnic groups and moved internal borders around to complicate the prospect of republics becoming independent countries.

Thus was a Slavic-populated strip of what might have been Ukraine appended to Romanian-speaking Moldova—yielding Trans-Dniester, a separatist region where wars have been fought. A similar strategy also applied to Ukraine to which territories that might plausibly have been in Russia were added; it is no reprieve for Russian President Vladimir Putin to appreciate that this stoked the war there. And so it was with Nagorno-Karabakh ending up in Azerbaijan.

In all cases, when the Soviet Union collapsed three decades ago, none of these countries had the presence of mind to dump these territories, whose unhappy populations anyway diluted the ethnic majority of the dominant group. In this, the newly formed countries found allies in the West. Traumatized by history, Western nations had little patience for separatist movements or border changes. Once you start, the thinking goes, there will be no end to the demands of squabbling tribes. On the one hand, true enough; on the other, a recipe for another kind of trouble.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic Armenians won control in a war in the early 1990s in which hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azerbaijanis were displaced. The area became a “self-governing entity” within Azerbaijan—but really self-governing, with massive ties to Armenia: the people had Armenian passports and not Azerbaijani ones, while living in territory which still was internationally recognized as Azerbaijan.

The issue became an obsession to the Baku-based regime of Ilham Aliyev. This regime is dictatorial (ranking 157 out of 176 on the Democracy Matrix index), kleptocratic (if the Pandora Papers be believed), and hostile to Armenians (see this Reuters story). In 2020, Azerbaijan attacked, winning back much of the lost area but keeping a rump Nagorno-Karabakh in place. At this point Aliyev decided to test Western resolve.

In September 2021, Azerbaijan launched a series of attacks on Armenian sovereign territory. Then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) chastised Aliyev, but no one threatened concrete action. So, in December 2022, Azeri “eco-activists” blockaded the Lachin Corridor which connects what remained of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. In February the International Court of Justice ordered the blockade ended, which Azerbaijan ignored, again with impunity. In June 2023 Baku dropped the eco-activist ruse and totally blockaded the region, not even allowing through Red Cross humanitarian missions.

At this point Luis Moreno Ocampo, former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, stepped in to declare Azerbaijan’s action a “genocide” by starvation, according to Article 2C of the UN Genocide Convention. Other experts, from the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention to Juan Mendez, the former chief genocide advisor at the United Nations, agreed. Yet even as people scrounged for turnips in the besieged area, no outside government lifted a finger. The UN Security Council and U.S. Congress conducted inconclusive debates.

For governments to accept Ocampo’s logic would require them to take action under the Genocide Convention. Yet the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan left no further patience for international adventure. So great is Western timidity that there was not even serious talk of economic sanctions.

Aliyev had a plausible argument on his side—the inviolability of borders, even silly ones created by the Soviet Union. So, he evidently calculated that no one would stop him and attacked on Sept. 19. Within a day the self-government folded and soon thereafter the entire population fled to Armenia; just a few miles away.

There are now plenty of questions. Should there be a right of return? Under what conditions? Could the status quo ante be restored? Can there be restitution of properties? Should the departure be considered an ethnic cleansing, yielding war crimes charges?

What is not in question is that the mass exodus is an embarrassment to Western powers—as evidenced by the tragic visage of Western humanitarian officials like Samantha Power who finally remembered to arrive upon the scene and survey the empty streets.

I write this from Yerevan, where I am advising an Armenian NGO trying to build civil society in the young democracy. There is debate here about what to do next. Some want to war crimes charges. Others want to focus on the future, and put aside the conflict that has for long defined their country. But no one has a kind word for Western democracies that stood by while tens of thousands were being starved.

I do not think the world wanted to appear so impotent. I don’t think the West wants governments to blatantly ignore the International Court of Justice. I don’t think the U.S. wants a world without rules. So why did the world ignore Ocampo? Does Azerbaijan’s natural gas and oil explain all?

The West’s mobilization on behalf of Ukraine—with weapons and funds, but not with direct involvement—obscures a more fundamental truth: We are born alone, we live alone and we die alone. You want to talk about shared values? That and four dollars will buy a cup of coffee.

U.S. Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Gary Peters (D-Mich.), Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Bill Cassidy (R-La.), Pete Ricketts (R-Neb.) and John Kennedy (R-La.) introduced legislation that would prevent the U.S. from providing security assistance to Azerbaijan until it has been determined that they are not taking offensive action against the Armenians. The Senators introduced the legislation in response to the unilateral seizure, by force of arms, of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan.

“The United States must send a clear message that we will not support the Azeri regime as it continues its campaign of ethnic cleansing against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh,” said Senator Van Hollen. “That’s why, in the face of its continued aggression and its blocking of critical humanitarian assistance, the Administration should immediately revoke Azerbaijan’s access to U.S. security assistance.”

“The Azerbaijani government has made it clear – it will use its military resources to eliminate the presence of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.” said Senator Peters. “The United States cannot be complicit in Azerbaijani violence against the Armenian people. We must pass this legislation to block additional American aid to Azerbaijan until it puts an end to its aggression in the region.”

“It’s absurd that our nation has provided security assistance to Azerbaijan for decades, despite existing law requiring the President to certify that Azerbaijan is not taking offensive action against Armenian,” said Senator Rubio. “This bill is an important first step, as would be sanctioning Azerbaijani officials under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.”

“The United States must take a stand to make sure the Azerbaijani government does not inflict further suffering on ethnic Armenians,” said Senator Shaheen. “I’m proud to help introduce this bipartisan legislation, which is intended to hold Azerbaijan accountable for its actions in Nagorno-Karabakh.”

“Through the 907 waiver authority, Americans saw their tax money used to provide weapons to Azerbaijan to attack lands where Armenians have lived for centuries. That is not only wrong, it’s perverse. This bill withdraws that authority,” said Dr. Cassidy.

The Armenian Protection Act would end U.S. assistance to the Azerbaijani government that is currently allowed under a waiver to Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Although the Freedom Support Act generally prohibits most bilateral assistance to Azerbaijan, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, waiver authority was added to Section 907 granting additional discretion to the President to provide aid to Azerbaijan. The waiver authority has been invoked annually by Presidents of both parties since 2002 and the Biden Administration is still reviewing its waiver authority for 2023.

Pipeline development in the Caspian region comes with geopolitical complexity. The countries directly involved in the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC)—Turkey and Azerbaijan—as well as Turkmenistan, Russia, and Iran have diverging geopolitical goals. Turkey and Azerbaijan are trying to maintain relations with both Russia and the European Union (EU) and Turkmenistan is trying to balance gas supplies between China and the EU while avoiding deteriorating relationships with its northern neighbors: Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Russia and Iran are trying to break geopolitical isolation, increase their influence in the region, and monetize locked-in gas reserves. Following an analysis of the economics of Caspian gas, in this Q&A, the author discusses how the challenge of balancing contradictory interests could be a risk for the EU, in terms of both the reliability of gas supply and instability in the region. 

Facing increasing pressure from the West, Russia has increased its efforts to reestablish a sphere of influence in Caspian and Central Asia. So far Russian authorities have taken the readiness of Azerbaijan and Turkey to increase gas supplies to the EU calmly, as they try to maintain friendly relations with the leaders of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Turkmenistan

There is no visible deterioration in relations between Russia and Azerbaijan[1] with presidents Vladmir Putin and Ilham Aliyev regularly meeting one another. Since 2022, Azerbaijan has provided an overland trade corridor between Iran and Russia, which has become extremely significant for Russia under sanctions [2]. There has also been a noticeable economic convergence between Russia and Turkmenistan in the past year and a half.[3] Amid frequent meetings, the two countries signed the Declaration on Deepening Strategic Partnership in June 2022. In particular, bilateral cooperation in the gas, oil and electricity sectors is growing, with Gazprom and Tatneft increasing their activities in the Turkmen market.[4]

Turkey has become a key Russian political and economic partner since the sanctions against Russia were introduced in 2022. Just before his re-election, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had stated that “Russia and Turkey need each other in every possible field.”[5] Despite the country’s membership of NATO, Turkey has, in fact, stepped up its economic ties with Russia since the start of the war, increasing imports of Russian oil embargoed by European countries.[6] In 2022, 40 percent of Turkey’s gas imports came from Russia.[7]

For now, the benefits to Russia of maintaining good relations with Turkic countries outweigh any potential downsides, including competition with these countries in the EU gas market. As discussed in the previous article.   Russia need not worry too much about competition; Azerbaijan itself is importing gas from Turkmenistan to fill gaps at the moment, while Turkmenistan is limited by the challenges of building the Trans-Caspian pipeline and commitments to China. And Turkey is now the biggest net importer of Russian gas.

Amidst declining export revenue, Russia is interested in holding onto the remaining opportunities to generate at least some income from gas exports to countries like Azerbaijan and Turkey. But there are still some “red lines”; Russia makes it clear that it would obstruct any attempt to build a Trans-Caspian pipeline on environmental grounds.[8] 

Source: https://www.sgc.az/en.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, re-elected as the President of Turkey in May 2023, has repeatedly announced his ambition to make Turkey a gas hub, while continuing to maintain special relations with Russia. He has frequently mentioned plans “to turn Turkey into a center in the energy sector of the Mediterranean, the Caspian region, and the Middle East.”[9] Putin echoes this rhetoric, but his statements seem to be motivated by the desire to send more Russian pipeline gas to Turkey, which can then be re-exported to Europe.[10] Putin observed in a meeting with Erdogan earlier this month that  Gazprom has submitted a road map for the hub to Turkish energy company BOTAS.[11] This suggests the likelihood of further strengthening of ties between Turkey and Russia. At the same time, since his re-lection, Erdogan has also been speaking about Turkey’s ambition to join the EU, although he has recently scaled back his ambitions.[12] Turkey believes it can leverage its existing and new trade relations to become a gas hub and is pushing its own gas exporting agenda to the EU. Although Turkey is trying to balance its relations with Europe and Russia, it`s becoming apparent that it will be difficult to build up such a hub without infringing on the interests of either Russia or the EU.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Central Asian countries seemed to be distancing themselves from Russia. But Moscow, with an understanding of the energy and social problems of these countries, is drawing them into ever closer cooperation—and perhaps, even greater dependence in the future. Facing severe gas deficit and winter blackouts, these countries will likely continue to buy Russian gas. In addition to cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, Russia is also focusing on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Agreements related to a tripartite gas union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, proposed in November 2022 by Putin and involving the transportation of Russian gas through the territories of these countries,[13] are starting to materialize.[14] According to the officials, transit deliveries of Russian gas to Uzbekistan could reach up to 10 bcm per year.[15] Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have obligations to supply gas to China and have significantly under-delivered in recent years due to domestic constraints. If Russian gas is supplied to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, at a favorable discount compared to the price of these countries’ exports to China, then Russia could somewhat make up for the loss of the EU market, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could increase gas supplies to China, receiving much-needed export earnings.

Russia is simultaneously tightening ties with Iran—also struggling to monetize its gas reserves. In August 2023, Russia and Iran reached agreements on the creation of an energy hub, according to Majid Chegani, Iran’s deputy oil minister and general director of the National Iranian Gas Company.[16] The idea may be to deliver gas to Iran through Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan via the gas pipeline system “Central Asia – Center” using it in reverse mode and potentially via Azerbaijan.[17] This could lead to the implementation of a gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and India. Another possibility is for Iran to collaborate with evolving Russian competences in LNG plant construction. Although these plans sound farfetched and do not look economically feasible, they are important for Russia from a geopolitical point of view—and cannot be completely ruled out.

For years, the EU has supported the creation of SGC and has been looking at Caspian gas as a viable diversification option. However, with Russia working hard to reestablish its influence in the region, these supplies might come with increasing geopolitical risk.

The region is volatile, as shown most recently by Azerbaijan’s military offensive against Armenians in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the countries participating in the SGC—Azerbaijan and potentially Turkmenistan—are authoritarian regimes lacking transparency.[18] Revenues from hydrocarbon exports are not used by the authorities to establish stable institutions. Instead, they primarily enrich the ruling elites.[19] This creates a risk that these countries may follow the path of other resource-based, unpredictable autocracies. Azerbaijan’s readiness to increase volumes through supplies from Russia and via Iran—while the Trans-Caspian is still in an early stage with questions about its future—adds additional risks to the expansion of SGC for the EU.

Despite the MoU signed by President Aliyev and president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen to double gas supplies from Azerbaijan by 2027, and Turkmenistan’s recent statement on its readiness to proceed with Trans-Caspian pipeline, the future expansion of the SGC remains uncertain.

It is questionable whether Azerbaijan can ensure the required gas volumes without increasing its reliance on Russia or Turkmenistan (via Iran or through a direct route). Participation of Turkmenistan is not guaranteed; challenges related to the financing of the Trans-Caspian project, as well as geopolitical tensions in Caspian remain in place.

The timing is critical; Europe needs this gas urgently, not in a decade’s time. In the next 2-3 years, substantial LNG volumes would become available globally, and by then the EU may have resolved its current energy supply crisis and moved further along on its energy transition path.

Still, the discussion on expanding supplies through the SGC will continue in the coming years, as the negotiating process itself is important for Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey from a geopolitical perspective.

[1] https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88651

[2] https://www.stimson.org/2023/russia-iran-converge-in-attempt-to-build-a-new-eurasian-order/

[3] https://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20230120/839535364.html

[4] https://tdh.gov.tm/ru/post/34395/turkmenistan-rossiya-kurs-na-diversifikaciyu-dvustoronnego-partnyorstva

[5] https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-special-relationship-russia-grow-recep-tayyip-erdogan-valdimir-putin/

[6] https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-special-relationship-russia-grow-recep-tayyip-erdogan-valdimir-putin/

[7] https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-03-10/turkeys-dream-a-hub-ankaras-wartime-gas-policy

[8] https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-smashing-time

[9] https://tass.com/economy/1556141

[10] https://www.dw.com/en/will-turkey-ever-become-a-russian-gas-hub/a-65053534

[11] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/disagreements-delay-russian-gas-hub-plans-turkey-sources-2023-09-14/

[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-country-could-part-ways-with-eu-if-necessary-2023-09-16/

[13] https://www.uzdaily.uz/ru/post/73735

[14] https://podrobno.uz/cat/uzbekistan-i-rossiya-dialog-partnerov-/gazovyy-soyuz-rossii-uzbekistana-i-kazakhstana-mozhet-rasshiritsya/

[15] https://www.rbc.ru/business/15/08/2023/64db4b429a79477e12def06c?from=newsfeed

[16] https://news.day.az/world/1587706.html

[17] https://itek.ru/analytics/trojstvennyj-gazovyj-sojuz/

[18] https://freedomhouse.org/explore-the-map?type=fiw&year=2023

[19]https://www.transparency.org/en/news/azerbaijani-laundromat-grand-corruption-and-how-to-buy-influence

As EU leaders gather in Granada on Thursday, their most publicised agenda item is the situation with Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of Nagorno-Karabakh following a 24-hour military operation that ended almost four decades of tension, writes EURACTIV.

The international press has focused on Azerbaijan’s strongman, Ilhan Aliyev, who snubbed the five-way talks planned on the sidelines of the summit with the leaders of France, Germany, and Armenia, hosted by Council President Charles Michel.

Such a snub is embarrassing for the hosts. But Aliyev is the EU’s favourite dictator. After Russia attacked Ukraine, Azerbaijan’s gas became precious as Russian supplies dwindled.

Aliyev has so far accepted all the invitations by the EU’s Michel to discuss Karabakh, and there were many photo opportunities with his Armenian counterpart Nikol Pashinyan, despite the total failure of the exercise.

Now Aliyev took Karabakh as a low-hanging fruit because he could.

He can also claim there is no ethnic cleansing: The population of 120,000 left to seek refuge in Armenia, not because Aliyev’s army drove them out but because they feared this would happen. There is no damage to civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and housing or to cultural and religious sites in Karabakh, the UN said.

So everything is fine, the EU’s favourite dictator has accomplished the perfect war – without casualties, without destruction, without war crimes.

Moreover, under international law, Nagorno-Karabakh is the territory of Azerbaijan, so one may argue that this was going to happen sooner or later.

Aliyev succeeded, it seems, because Europe has forgotten how things went down in Munich in 1938.

Appeasing the dictator (Hitler in that case) was the basis of the 1938 agreement between France, the UK, fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany. It essentially provided for the German annexation of a part of Czechoslovakia called the Sudetenland, where more than three million people, mainly ethnic Germans, lived.

Giving Hitler “what he wants” to appease him was of course a shameful and wrong move.

Aliyev is suspected of gearing up for another war, whose aim is to establish a land corridor between the Azeri enclave of Nahichivan and mainland Azerbaijan – by grabbing Armenian territory.

And he has the support of Turkey, which has megalomaniac dreams about a bigger Turkic corridor, all the way from Anatolia to the Uigurs in China. The only piece of land lacking to complete this puzzle is Armenian territory.

Aliyev knew he would be under pressure in Granada, alone against four at the five-way talks, so he turned down the invitation. As a pretext, he used “pro-Armenian statements” by French officials and an alleged French decision to supply Yerevan with military equipment.

French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna was the first Western official to visit Yerevan after the fall of Karabakh. But she didn’t announce a decision to supply Armenia with French armament. What she said was:

“France has given its agreement to the conclusion of future contracts with Armenia, which will allow the delivery of military equipment to Armenia so that it can ensure its defence.”

Giving “an agreement” for the conclusion of future contracts does not mean military supplies would start anytime soon. And France doesn’t have much to send anyway, as the supplies sent to Ukraine have dried up the stocks.

The real context: France is home to half a million ethnic Armenians and Colonna needed to visit Yerevan and say something that would sound nice and appropriate. Aliyev knows that, but the pretext was just too good to pass up.

The EU made a major mistake by not inviting Turkish President Recep Erdoğan to the five-way mediation talks in Granada. The Turkish president is a major player in the region, and a strong backer of Azerbaijan, and should not be absent from such talks.

If the Granada meeting was expected to be a milestone, indeed, it will be one, in terms of failed European policies.

The gathering will likely encourage Aliyev and Erdoğan to go ahead and grab from Armenia what they want. The Armenians can try to fight – but perhaps they had better surrender. It seems no one is really prepared to help them.