Day: October 5, 2023

Israel has quietly helped fuel Azerbaijan’s campaign to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh, supplying powerful weapons to Azerbaijan ahead of its lightning offensive last month that brought the ethnic Armenian enclave back under its control, officials and experts say.

Just weeks before Azerbaijan launched its 24-hour assault on Sept. 19, Azerbaijani military cargo planes repeatedly flew between a southern Israeli airbase and an airfield near Nagorno-Karabakh, according to flight tracking data and Armenian diplomats, even as Western governments were urging peace talks.

The flights rattled Armenian officials in Yerevan, long wary of the strategic alliance between Israel and Azerbaijan, and shined a light on Israel’s national interests in the restive region south of the Caucasus Mountains.

“For us, it is a major concern that Israeli weapons have been firing at our people,” Arman Akopian, Armenia’s ambassador to Israel, told The Associated Press. In a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, Mr. Akopian said he expressed alarm to Israeli politicians and lawmakers in recent weeks over Israeli weapons shipments.

“I don’t see why Israel should not be in the position to express at least some concern about the fate of people being expelled from their homeland,” he told the AP.

Israel has a big stake in Azerbaijan, which serves as a critical source of oil and is a staunch ally against Israel’s archenemy Iran. It is also a lucrative customer of sophisticated arms.

“There’s no doubt about our position in support of Azerbaijan’s defense,” said Arkady Mil-man, Israel’s former ambassador to Azerbaijan and current senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. “We have a strategic partnership to contain Iran.”

Azerbaijan’s September blitz involving heavy artillery, rocket launchers, and drones – largely supplied by Israel and Turkey, according to experts – forced Armenian separatist authorities to lay down their weapons and sit down for talks on the future of the separatist region.

The Azerbaijani offensive killed over 200 Armenians in the enclave, the vast majority of them fighters, and some 200 Azerbaijani troops, according to officials.

There are ramifications beyond the volatile enclave of 4,400 square kilometers (1,700 square miles). The fighting prompted over 100,000 people – more than 80% of the enclave’s ethnic Armenian residents – to flee in the last two weeks. Azerbaijan has pledged to respect the rights of ethnic Armenians.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has termed the exodus “a direct act of an ethnic cleansing.” Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry strongly rejected the accusation, saying the departures are a “personal and individual decision and [have] nothing to do with forced relocation.”

Israel’s foreign and defense ministries declined to comment on the use of Israeli weapons in Nagorno-Karabakh or on Armenian concerns about its military partnership with Azerbaijan. In July, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant visited Baku, the Azerbaijan capital, where he praised the countries’ military cooperation and joint “fight against terrorism.”

Although once resource-poor Israel now has plenty of natural gas off its Mediterranean coast, Azerbaijan still supplies at least 40% of Israel’s oil needs, keeping cars and trucks on its roads. Israel turned to Baku’s offshore deposits in the late 1990s, creating an oil pipeline through the Turkish transport hub of Ceyan that isolated Iran, which at the time capitalized on oil flowing through its pipelines from Kazakhstan to world markets.

Azerbaijan has long been suspicious of Iran, its fellow Shiite Muslim neighbor on the Caspian Sea, and chafed at its support for Armenia, which is Christian. Iran has accused Azerbaijan of hosting a base for Israeli intelligence operations against it – a claim that Azerbaijan and Israel deny.

“It’s clear to us that Israel has an interest in keeping a military presence in Azerbaijan, using its territory to observe Iran,” Armenian diplomat Tigran Balayan said.

Few have benefited more from the two countries’ close relations than Israeli military contractors. Experts estimate Israel supplied Azerbaijan with nearly 70% of its arsenal between 2016 and 2020 – giving Azerbaijan an edge against Armenia and boosting Israel’s large defense industry.

“Israeli arms have played a very significant role in allowing the Azerbaijani army to reach its objectives,” said Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks arms sales.

Israeli long-range missiles and exploding drones known as loitering munitions have made up for Azerbaijan’s small air force, Mr. Wezeman said, even at times striking deep within Armenia itself. Meanwhile, Israeli Barak-8 surface-to-air missiles have protected Azerbaijan’s airspace in shooting down missiles and drones, he added.

Just ahead of last month’s offensive, the Azerbaijani defense ministry announced the army conducted a missile test of Barak-8. Its developer, Israel Aerospace Industries, declined to comment on Azerbaijan’s use of its air defense system and combat drones.

But Azerbaijan has raved about the success of Israeli drones in slicing through the Armenian defenses and tipping the balance in the bloody six-week war in 2020.

Its defense minister in 2016 called a combat drone manufactured by Israel’s Aeronautics Group “a nightmare for the Armenian army,” which backed the region’s separatists during Azerbaijan’s conflict with Nagorno-Karabakh that year.

President Ilham Aliyev in 2021 – a year of deadly Azerbaijan-Armenian border clashes – was captured on camera smiling as he stroked the small Israeli suicide drone “Harop” during an arms showcase.

Israel has deployed similar suicide drones during deadly army raids against Palestinian militants in the occupied West Bank.

“We’re glad for this cooperation, it was quite supportive and quite beneficial for defense,” Azerbaijani’s ambassador to Israel, Mukhtar Mammadov told the AP, speaking generally about Israel’s support for the Azerbaijani military. “We’re not hiding it.”

At a crucial moment in early September – as diplomats scrambled to avert an escalation – flight tracking data shows that Azerbaijani cargo planes began to stream into Ovda, a military base in southern Israel with a 3,000-meter-long airstrip, known as the only airport in Israel that handles the export of explosives.

The AP identified at least six flights operated by Azerbaijan’s Silk Way Airlines landing at Ovda airport between Sept. 1 and Sept. 17 from Baku, according to aviation-tracking website FlightRadar24.com. Azerbaijan launched its offensive two days later.

During those six days, the Russian-made Ilyushin Il-76 military transport lingered on Ovda’s tarmac for several hours before departing for either Baku or Ganja, the country’s second-largest city, just north of Nagorno-Karabakh.

In March, an investigation by the Haaretz newspaper said it had counted 92 Azerbaijani military cargo flights to Ovda airport from 2016-2020. Sudden surges of flights coincided with upticks of fighting in Nagorno-Karabkh, it found.

“During the 2020 war, we saw flights every other day and now, again, we see this intensity of flights leading up to the current conflict,” said Akopian, the Armenian ambassador. “It is clear to us what’s happening.”

Israel’s defense ministry declined to comment on the flights. The Azerbaijani ambassador, Mammadov, said he was aware of the reports but declined to comment.

The decision to support an autocratic government against an ethnic and religious minority has fueled a debate in Israel about the country’s permissive arms export policies. Of the top 10 arms manufacturers globally, only Israel and Russia lack legal restrictions on weapons exports based on human rights concerns.

“If anyone can identify with [Nagorno-Karabakh] Armenians’ continuing fear of ethnic cleansing it is the Jewish people,” said Avidan Freedman, founder of the Israeli advocacy group Yanshoof, which seeks to stop Israeli arms sales to human rights violators. “We’re not interested in becoming accomplices.”

This story was reported by The Associated Press

Fatih Yurtsever*

The outcome of the military operation launched by Azerbaijan against Armenia in 2020 to liberate Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven occupied districts around it and subsequent developments led to geopolitical changes in the South Caucasus. These changes, combined with Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war after Feb. 24, 2022 and the Russian military’s performance in Ukraine, which fell far short of expectations, made assumptions about the effectiveness of Russian military power questionable. The erosion of Russia’s political and military power has created new opportunities for cooperation between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. However, Turkey’s unconditional support for Azerbaijan against Armenia, based on nationalist motives, its failure to open the border gates with Armenia, which have been closed since 1993, and its failure to normalize diplomatic relations with Armenia — Turkey suspended diplomatic relations with Armenia in 1993 due to Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijan’s Kalbajar region — have complicated regional cooperation and given Russia the opportunity to maintain its influence in the South Caucasus by exploiting the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. So, what should Turkey do to reverse this trend?

In 2023 the Azerbaijani army successfully took control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which had been declared Azerbaijani territory in a 1991 declaration at the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The CIS was created by a treaty among Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on Dec. 8 of that year, marking the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, a referendum held in Nagorno-Karabakh on Dec. 10, 1991 resulted in a 99.89 percent vote in favor of full independence, which Azerbaijan did not recognize, leading to the termination of the region’s autonomous status. During Azerbaijan’s attempts to take over the administration, the Armenian government supported the independence movement in Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to a violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that lasted until 1994.

During this period Armenia occupied seven Azerbaijani districts in addition to Nagorno-Karabakh. However, between 1994 and 2020, Azerbaijan made significant progress in modernizing and strengthening its army using its economic power, particularly through arms purchases from Israel and Turkey. In 2020 Azerbaijan launched a successful military operation that allowed it to regain its occupied territories with the help of the aforementioned weapons and its strengthened army. A ceasefire agreement was brokered on Nov. 9, 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia through Russian mediation.

Although Azerbaijan liberated seven districts around Nagorno-Karabakh from occupation with the military operation it carried out in 2020, Russian peacekeepers settled in the Nagorno-Karabakh region in accordance with the agreement reached with Armenia under the mediation of Russia. Russia’s main strategy was to spread the resolution of the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region over time and to ensure the signing of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia under its mediation. However, since Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan recognized the Nagorno-Karabakh region as Azerbaijani territory in line with the Almaty Declaration, Azerbaijan diplomatically assessed that the conditions and international conjuncture were in its favor and carried out a military operation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region on Sept.19 and took full control of the region. As a result of the conflict in the region, 120,000 Armenians are currently migrating to Armenia through the Lachin Corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

This migration will have significant effects on the political and economic life of Armenia. The current president of Armenia, Pashinyan, is in favor of freeing Armenia from Russian influence and establishing good relations with EU countries and the United States. Pashinyan believes that the Russian-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization, of which Armenia is a member, cannot meet Armenia’s security needs because it has not responded to Armenia’s request for assistance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, Armenia is economically dependent on Russia. Russians own the railway company and natural gas distribution company in the country. Russian troops protect Armenia’s borders. Therefore, Armenia needs to establish good economic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan to eliminate Russia’s influence.

In fact, now is the most favorable time for Turkey to open the border gates with Armenia and start diplomatic relations. Pashinyan is moderate and reasonable. However, both the additional burden on the economy caused by the Armenian population coming from Nagorno-Karabakh and the discontent among Armenian nationalists due to the abandonment of the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Azerbaijan have put Pashinyan’s political future at risk. But Turkey’s opening the border gates with Armenia may lead to a revival in the Armenian economy. Furthermore, the EU and the United States are also in favor of Armenia ridding itself of Russian influence. Therefore, Turkey can rebuild Armenia’s natural gas infrastructure and supply natural gas to Armenia, especially with the financial support provided by the EU and the political support of the United States.

One more point should be underlined here. A solution in the South Caucasus that completely excludes Russia will not last long at this stage. Therefore, Turkey should follow a roadmap utilizing its good relations with Russia. First of all, Turkey should stop the flow of migration from the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Armenia by using its influence on Azerbaijan. An international commission including Russia led by Turkey should monitor the situation and living conditions of Armenians here. Turkey should immediately initiate the necessary diplomatic initiatives in this regard. Secondly, Turkey should guarantee the territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this way, Armenia’s hand should be strengthened to end the Russian military presence in its country. Turkey should establish a “South Caucasus Economic Union” in which Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan will be included. Russia and Iran can also become members of this union if they wish. As a condition for joining this union, the member states should recognize each other’s borders and pledge not to intervene militarily against each other.

However, Turkey is not taking any of the steps outlined above. On the contrary, it supports Azerbaijan due to its nationalist agenda and is working to destabilize Armenia. While the Turkish public is preoccupied with the geopolitical gains of the Zangezur corridor that will link Turkey, Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan, which will require Armenian approval, they are ignoring the fact that Russian troops still guard the borders of Armenia and that part of this corridor that will pass through Armenian territory will be under the control of Russia.

The ongoing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the fact that Turkey severed diplomatic relations with Armenia in 1993 and has kept its border gates with Armenia closed have served to protect Russia’s interests and expand its influence in the South Caucasus, while isolating Armenia in the region. Germany, China and the US are organizing summits in the 5+1 format to improve their relations with the Central Asian countries. The development of Turkey’s relations with these countries depends on the regional integration to be established in the South Caucasus. Turkey can access the Caspian Sea and from there the Turkic world through a corridor that will traverse the territories of Turkey-Nakhchivan-Armenia-Azerbaijan with Armenia’s participation and approval, with Russian troops out of the equation. Central Asia and the South Caucasus’s economic integration would serve the interests of all. Russia’s weakening power in Ukraine paves the way for such regional integration projects. For this, historic animosities and nationalist feelings on both the Turkish and Armenian sides should be put aside, and conditions should be created for everyone to come together. It is imperative that Turkey expedite the normalization of relations with Armenia. The continuation of a nationalist-oriented foreign policy by Turkey not only exacerbates regional discord but also provides a conduit for Russia to solidify its foothold in the area.

* Fatih Yurtsever is a former naval officer in the Turkish Armed Forces. He is using a pseudonym out of security concerns.

Abkhazia leader announces the signing of an agreement to establish a permanent Russian naval base in Abkhazia.

On Western policy in the South Caucasus

“The Armenian-backed displacement of Armenians from Karabakh has put the West in a quandary. If they continue to bend the pro-Armenian line and call what happened ‘ethnic cleansing,’ they will put themselves in a narrow framework of unilateral condemnation of Azerbaijan,” the South Caucasus Analytical Center says in an article.

“Pashinyan‘s support in Armenia is realistic only through reaching an agreement with Baku, and the West must realize this inevitability. Otherwise, another and much bigger collapse of its regional policy awaits it.”

Experts of the South Caucasus Analytical Center (CSSC) analyzed the regional policy of the United States and the European Union in the light of recent developments in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict.

“Will the West admit its mistakes?”

“After Azerbaijan’s counter-terrorist operation in Karabakh, the Western media characterizes the activities of Washington and Brussels in the South Caucasus with such formulae as “the collapse of US and EU policy”, “defeat of Western diplomacy”, “inactivity”.

Usually, two kinds of conclusions are drawn after defeats:

• We did everything right, but were defeated because of the misguided actions of others. We should stick to the old rules;
• We made a mistake. We failed to take something into account somewhere and must change our approaches.

Will the West admit its mistakes, or will it insist that it is acting correctly?

A lot has been said about the West’s mistakes: pro-Armenian approaches, ignoring the expectations of the Azerbaijani side and creating conditions for Russian intervention – all this has led to the West’s current position in our region.

Classification of Western interests in the region

“The Armenian-backed displacement of Armenians from Karabakh has put the West in a difficult position. If they continue to pursue a pro-Armenian line and call what happened “ethnic cleansing”, they will put themselves in a narrow frame of unilateral condemnation of Azerbaijan.

So what does the West want from the South Caucasus, and how can it achieve something positive in the current situation?

If we briefly describe the West’s interests in our region, and the countries involved under these interests, we will get the following picture:

• Energy: Azerbaijan is a source and transit country, Georgia is a transit country;
• Communications: Azerbaijan and Georgia have transit functions;
• Predictability of the region: all three countries;
• Iranian issue of interest to the U.S.: joint work with Azerbaijan and Armenia;
• Ousting Russia: all three countries, but Yerevan is prioritized because of Russia’s greater presence in the country;
• Liberal interference: all three countries, but at the current historical moment and in this context the Pashinyan regime in Yerevan is closer to the West and Armenia’s security is too important for it.

From a geo-economic point of view, Western interests in the region stem from mutual relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia. From the geopolitical point of view, the West’s confrontation with Russia takes place in Armenia, and the confrontation with Iran in the perimeter of Azerbaijan and Armenia. In the Iranian issue, the interests of the US and Azerbaijan coincide, but Yerevan has a different view – for Armenia, relations with Iran and the West are almost equally important.”

“How can the West become effective?”

“And how should the West be effective in the region?

The statements and actions of the U.S. and the European Union have created a situation of time pressure. If they continue in the same vein, problems with Azerbaijan and loss of positions in the region are inevitable. Therefore, there is a need for evolution of regional policy of Washington and Brussels.

Now the collapse of the unilateral position should force the West to reconsider its approaches. Otherwise, continuation of a defeated policy will lead to even greater losses.

In the current situation, the priority for the West is to support the Pashinyan regime and to preserve Armenia’s security.

Based on this logic, if pro-Russian forces take over power in Armenia, Western support will not be as active.

If support for Armenia will be realized through pressure on Azerbaijan, then in this case Baku in the current situation will be interested in overthrowing Pashinyan’s power. And this is not a pro-Russian line of Azerbaijan, simply in this context the interests of Baku and Moscow actually coincide. Because only in such a confluence of circumstances Baku can target Western interests in the region.

If the West takes a critical view of its regional policy and makes operational changes, Baku may be interested in preserving the Pashinyan regime in Armenia.

The meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan in Granada will demonstrate what path the U.S. and EU will choose. Baku offers the sides a chance to become more constructive. Baku has brought closer the moment that all stakeholders have long warned about: Azerbaijan has fully restored its sovereignty over the entire territory of the country, and achieved this without signing a peace treaty.

Pashinyan’s support in Armenia is realistic only through reaching an agreement with Baku, and the West must realize this inevitability. Otherwise, another and much larger collapse of its regional policy awaits it.”

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